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The Right to Work and the Right to Strike
Laura Weinrib†

This term, the Supreme Court will consider Janus v. AFSCME, the
newest installment in an antilabor campaign on behalf of a constitutionally protected “right to work.”1 Drawing on recent business-friendly
First Amendment decisions, opponents of organized labor contend that
“fair-share” agency fee agreements, which require non-members of a
union to pay their proportionate share of collective bargaining and contract administration expenses, can no longer weather constitutional
scrutiny.2 These advocates argue that the extent to which employees
within a bargaining unit are required to contribute to the costs incurred
on their behalf by a labor organization designated to represent them
should be deferred neither to agreements between unions and employers nor to the legislative process. Rather, they urge the Court to prohibit
any such payment as a matter of constitutional law.
Whatever their policy preferences, commentators have regarded
the new judicial openness to economically inflected free expression
claims of the kind proposed in Janus v. AFSCME as a departure from,
or at least a significant extension of, traditional First Amendment principles.3 By contrast, this essay demonstrates that advocates articulated
related arguments as early as the 1930s, when the modern First
Amendment took shape. Moreover, although they did not yet prevail in
court, such arguments helped to garner broad-based support for the Supreme Court’s speech-protective turn at a time when liberals and labor
groups were deeply suspicious of court-centered constitutionalism.4 Yet
to the extent they were credited at all, antiunion First Amendment

†
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1
On the history of the term “right to work” and contestation over its meaning, see SOPHIA Z.
LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 60 (2014).
2
See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2014).
3
For an overview of recent developments involving labor law and the First Amendment, see
infra Part I.
4
Labor and liberal antipathy toward judicial review is discussed in Part II.
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claims were a secondary component of the perceived First Amendment
bundle, which also included a robust right to strike. In fact, the right to
strike was the core issue around which the interwar civil liberties movement coalesced.5
Soon after extending constitutional protection to labor activity, the
Supreme Court reversed course, concerned that insulating labor relations from state regulation would exacerbate industrial unrest and replicate the judicial overreaching it so recently had repudiated. Over the
ensuing decades, it backed away from strong First Amendment protection in the labor law domain, a retreat that applied to pro- and antiunion activity alike. It denied constitutionally protected status to secondary boycotts, wildcat strikes, and mass picketing even as it rejected
claims to the associational autonomy of individual workers.6 But its
anomalous analysis in First Amendment labor cases always was
roughly even-handed. As it weighs the arguments in Janus v. AFSCME,
the Supreme Court would do well to contemplate the consequences of
unraveling a constitutional compromise that has proven stable for more
than half a century.
I.

LABOR LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In Janus v. AFSCME, the Supreme Court will confront a now familiar question: whether public sector agency fee arrangements that
compel non-members to contribute to a union’s contract negotiation and
administration expenses are consistent with the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. That is a question the Court has long
since answered in the affirmative but that antiunion advocates have
repeatedly urged it to reconsider.7
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted federal private sector labor law to permit union security
agreements but to prohibit a labor organization from requiring employ-

5

These arguments are developed in Part III.
See infra Part III and the conclusion.
7
For the history of the arguments in these cases and the advocates who advanced them, see
LEE, supra note 1; Joseph A. McCartin, “A Wagner Act for Public Employees”: Labor’s Deferred
Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970–1976, 95 J. AM. HIST. 123 (2008).
6
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ees to become members or contribute financially to its political or ideological activity.8 In its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,9 the Court extended that rule to public sector employees. That
is, although Abood prevented states from compelling public employees
to join a union or to pay toward a union’s political expenses, the Court
deemed it constitutionally permissible to collect mandatory contributions toward a union’s “chargeable expenses,”10 including the costs of
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.11 States were therefore free to authorize the same modified
agency shop arrangements that were common in private sector workplaces governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 and Railway Labor Act.13
The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Harris v. Quinn,14 a 2014
challenge to a public sector fair-share arrangement involving Illinois
home health workers. A five-justice majority ruled for the petitioners,
who were assisted by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, on the narrow factual grounds that they were not full-fledged
state employees. Encouraged by dicta in Harris that was extremely critical of Abood, the right-to-work movement pressed forward.15 Just two
years later, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,16 the non-members asked the Court to invalidate a California public sector agency
shop arrangement. They argued that there is no constitutionally relevant distinction between lobbying the government and bargaining with
the government, because the issues at stake in public sector collective
bargaining invariably implicate important public interests.17 Many ob-

8

The early cases involved the Railway Labor Act. Ry. Emp.’s Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
721 (1956) (holding that the union shop agreements permitted by the Railway Labor Act do not
violate the First Amendment); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961)
(construing the Railway Labor Act to prohibit the use of non-members’ dues for political causes).
Street was extended to the NLRA in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
9
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
10
In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012), the Supreme Court defined
“chargeable expenses” as “the cost of union services related to collective bargaining” and as distinct
from the union’s “political or ideological projects.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 232, included among chargeable expenses the costs of “collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes.”
11
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
12
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2016).
13
45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2016).
14
134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
15
Id. at 2632.
16
136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
17
Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)
(No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5261564. The petitioners argued in the alternative that unions should be
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servers anticipated that a five-justice majority would seize the opportunity to declare agency fees unconstitutional.18 But the Court did not
issue its decision until March 2016, after the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia. The eight remaining justices deadlocked, leaving Abood intact.
Like his precursors, Illinois state employee Mark Janus—with legal representation from the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation and the Illinois-based Liberty Justice Center—seeks to persuade the Supreme Court that public sector agency fees are incompatible with today’s First Amendment landscape. Indeed, the petition for
writ of certiorari in Janus v. AFSCME describes this central and
longstanding feature of public sector labor law as “the largest regime of
compelled speech in the nation.”19 With the addition to the Court of Justice Neil Gorsuch, it is widely expected that a five-justice majority will
accept the persistent invitation to overrule Abood and impose a rightto-work regime on all public sector workers.20
The American labor law system is an unusual one, and it reflects a
complicated balancing by legislatures and the courts of individual and
group rights, as well as broader structural issues.21 The prevailing approach, which is modeled on the NLRA, allows workers to determine as
a group whether union representation will serve their interests.22 Once
a union has attained the support of a majority of employees within a
designated bargaining unit, it represents all the workers within the
unit on an exclusive basis.23 Many state governments have opted to bargain with the unions that represent majorities of their workers, just as
federal law requires most private sector employers to do.24 In exchange,
employers—whether public or private sector—are usually shielded
permitted to collect contributions toward chargeable expenses only from non-members who opted
in to payments. Id. at 15.
18
See, e.g., Amy Howe, Union Fees in Jeopardy: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11,
2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/union-fees-in-jeopardy-in-plain-english [htt
ps://perma.cc/T8HX-TH2A].
19
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Janus v. AFSCME, 8.
20
E.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Hear Case on Mandatory Fees to Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017 (noting that Gorsuch “is likely to supply a fifth vote against the unions”).
21
See generally Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV.
169, 221–24 (2015). Estlund’s insightful analysis focuses on the post Taft-Hartley period. This
essay emphasizes that in the labor context, ambivalence over the First Amendment, and especially
its relationship to the right to strike and the right to work, stretches back to the earliest days of
the NLRA and is rooted in the constitutional cases of the early twentieth century.
22
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977).
23
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining.”).
24
The duty to bargain does not, however, “compel either party to agree to a proposal.” Id. at
§ 158(d).
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from contending with demands by competing unions.25 They need not
negotiate or enforce multiple contracts. And they are protected from
costly recognitional and secondary strikes.26
Of course, employees who object to union representation, whether
they favor an alternative union or oppose all unions, are not without
recourse. If a majority of employees are dissatisfied with a union, they
can vote to decertify it. If dissenting employees are in the minority, they
are free to express their disapproval of union policies, to refuse to participate in strikes, and to withhold payment of fees that exceed what
Abood and its private sector analogs allowed.27 Moreover, a mix of state
statutes and case law imposes on unions a “duty of fair representation,”
which prohibits them from retaliating against or otherwise disfavoring
non-members.28 That is, any wage increases or benefits the union negotiates on behalf of its members extend to non-members as well—even
when it would advantage members to trade the interests of non-members for enhanced benefits for themselves—and unions are obligated to
represent non-members just as vigorously in grievance and arbitration
procedures.29
The result is the much-debated free rider problem, which Justice
Scalia construed a quarter-century ago as creating a “compelling state
interest” sufficient to justify a state in “permit[ting] the union to demand reimbursement.”30 In the absence of a duty of fair representation,
employees who desired to share in union-negotiated benefits would
have no choice but to join the union. By contrast, employees have little

25

See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65–70 (1975) (rejecting the argument that national anti-discrimination policy requires an exception to the principle
of exclusive representation where employees “seek to bargain separately with their employer as to
the elimination of racially discriminatory employment practices”).
26
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(recognitional picketing); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (secondary activity).
27
See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115–16 (1985) (upholding NLRB’s
construction of the NLRA to prohibit a union from fining employees who had tendered their resignation during a strike).
28
The duty of fair representation originated in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 202–03 (1944).
29
As a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law, states may elect to prohibit “agreements requiring membership in a labor organization.” The language of section 14(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b), part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA, is generally thought to
permit states to prohibit agency fees, though this reading is dictated neither by the text of the
statute nor by Supreme Court precedent. See, for example, Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 221–24 (2015); Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 859, 862–68 (2014).
30
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part); see also Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 753 (1988);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224–26 (1977); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 767 (1961).
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direct incentive to contribute financially to a union that is legally required to represent them just as zealously as members. The fewer the
number of dues-paying members, the less effective the union becomes,
which in turn renders the remaining members less eager to pay dues.
Fair-share agency fees long ago emerged as the most tenable solution.
Opponents of Abood point to other areas of First Amendment law
in which the Supreme Court has recognized compelled payments and
subsidies as unconstitutional. Some of those cases postdate Abood, raising the possibility that public sector fair-share fees are no longer consistent with First Amendment doctrine.31 There are plausible arguments to be made on both sides of this debate. And yet, as a matter of
First Amendment doctrine, as well as sound public policy, the status of
fair-share fees cannot be divorced from the broader labor law regime in
which they are situated. Abood reflects a careful balance between the
associational rights of unions and their members, on the one hand, and
the rights of non-members to opt out on the other.32 More starkly, to the
extent that fair-share fees trench on otherwise insulated First Amendment terrain, they are hardly the worst offenders within the labor law
domain. After all, state legislation as well as federal labor law expressly
curtails First Amendment activity that is virtually immune from regulation in other contexts, including the ability of workers to picket, boycott, and strike.
In short, from a historical perspective, the question whether compelled contributions toward chargeable expenses by public sector employees are closer to mushroom-growing subsidies33 or integrated bar
dues34 is somewhat beside the point. The crucial question is why the
Supreme Court has proven so reluctant to extend even paradigmatic

31

See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) (refusing to uphold “compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself ”);
Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (noting that past holdings permitting closed
shop agreements and opt-out billing schemes “have substantially impinged on the First Amendment rights of nonmembers” and rejecting “any further impingement”).
32
Catherine Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou have persuasively argued that compelled representation of non-members in the absence of agency fees, which is necessarily funded by the payments of members who would prefer not to subsidize non-members, is a First Amendment violation
to precisely the same extent as compelled payment of dues by non-members who would prefer not
to subsidize the union and its members. That is, either both or neither are unconstitutional. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled
Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 (2015); see also Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring
Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 862–68 (2014).
33
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
34
Like Abood, cases on integrated bar dues have precluded use of compulsory fees for political
purposes. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Kingstad v. State Bar, 622 F.3d 708 (7th
Cir. 2010).
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First Amendment protections to labor unions, employers, and dissenting employees. Understanding today’s speech-restrictive labor law regime requires exhuming a historical world that has slipped from view.
A constitutional prohibition on fair-share agency fees would alter a
single component of a complicated labor law system without regard to
related provisions. In our period of low union density and relative labor
quiescence—in which some combination of legal, social, and economic
impediments has rendered even simple work stoppages virtually nonexistent35—judges and advocates have forgotten a phenomenon that the
Abood Court grasped well. In the context of labor law, the First Amendment is a precarious thread, and pulling on it threatens to unravel the
whole structure of American labor relations.
II. ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE LOCHNER ERA
That the subsidence of American labor unrest has coincided with a
new judicial openness to economically inflected First Amendment
claims is presumably no accident. The Janus case is part of a mounting
effort to challenge social and economic regulation through the guise of
the First Amendment. The past decades have witnessed a marked shift
in First Amendment law from the protection of disfavored minorities
against state suppression to the insulation of industrial interests
against government regulation.36 That effort has overlapped almost
perfectly with the decline in labor’s power, whose symbolic harbinger—
President Ronald Reagan’s hiring of permanent replacements in the
1981 air traffic controller strike—came just months after the Supreme
Court issued a watershed decision on promotional advertising that reflected increasing resistance to the regulation of commercial speech.37
Today, as labor struggles to redefine its role and relevance and to imagine a legal regime more conducive to its political and economic goals,38
35

In 2015, the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded twelve major strikes
and lockouts involving a total of 47,000 workers. During the mid-twentieth century, annual totals
sometimes approached five hundred major strikes and over two million workers. Economic News
Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.
t01.htm [https://perma.cc/G6HC-R8MM] (last modified Feb. 9, 2017).
36
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 223 (2015). For early analysis of this transformation, see
MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH (1991); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (Free Press 1993).
37
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Supreme
Court had already narrowed the permissible regulation of informational advertising in Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). On the significance of the
PATCO strike, see JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2011).
38
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1 (2016).
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empirical evidence suggests that almost half of First Amendment victories benefit business corporations and trade groups challenging unwelcome regulatory interventions.39
This transformation has aptly been labeled the Lochnerization of
the First Amendment,40 on the theory that businesses are using the
First Amendment to do the work that substantive due process once performed in the era of Lochner v. New York,41 the notorious 1905 Supreme
Court case invalidating a New York maximum-hours law for bakers as
an infringement of liberty of contract.42 That is, like liberty of contract
in the early twentieth century, the First Amendment is being used today to dismantle burdensome regulatory regimes.
The literature characterizes this transformation as a new direction
in First Amendment law, but from the standpoint of the interwar coalition that litigated the foundational First Amendment cases, it might
better be classified as a course correction. As I have argued elsewhere,
the Lochnerization of the First Amendment began many decades ago.
In fact, it began almost the instant that Lochner itself was put to rest.
Lochner’s anti-regulatory constitutionalism was embedded in the First
Amendment at the moment that the so-called New Deal settlement was
struck. And it was integrally related to Progressive Era labor conflict.43
Today, Lochner-era jurisprudence is most closely identified with
the cases whose facts resemble Lochner’s: cases, that is, in which state
and federal courts invalidated legislative efforts to improve workplace
safety or dictate the terms of employment. For the early labor movement, however, such decisions represented only one component of a
broader judicial hostility to workers’ rights. For example, the Supreme
Court’s 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,44 which first read liberty
39

See Coates, supra note 36, at 250–52.
See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384; Morton Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109–16 (1993) (discussing
“The Lochnerization of the First Amendment”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s
First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 133 (2016). Recent scholarship has examined the significance of the deregulatory First
Amendment in the labor context. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment
at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (2016); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace:
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 100 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016); Cynthia Estlund, Truth,
Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. 349 (2017).
41
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42
Id. at 64.
43
See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016) [hereinafter WEINRIB, TAMING]; Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the
Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297; Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor,
and the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
44
165 U.S. 578 (1897).
40
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of contract into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
hamstrung unions as much as or more than progressive legislatures.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the federal judiciary cabined legislative power to authorize union activity while expanding its own authority to curtail strikes and boycotts.45 In 1908, the
Supreme Court struck down a federal prohibition on anti-union discrimination in the railroad industry for abridging workers’ freedom of
contract under the Fifth Amendment.46 In 1915, it extended that holding to the states.47 Relying on “constitutional freedom of contract” under
the Fourteenth Amendment,48 it invalidated a state law that made it
unlawful for an employer to require an employee to enter into an agreement “not to join or become or remain a member of any labor organization or association, as a condition of such person or persons securing
employment.”49 Rejecting the state’s asserted effort to limit employer
“coercion” and to ensure the liberty of workers to join organizations of
their choosing, the Court construed the targeted yellow-dog contracts as
advancing the right of an employee “to work for whom he will.”50 Two
years later, it upheld a controversial injunction against the United
Mine Workers that encompassed efforts to persuade workers to join the
union, because the prospective recruits had exercised their “constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property” by signing yellowdog contracts.51 And in 1921, the newly appointed chief justice William
Howard Taft issued an opinion in Truax v. Corrigan,52 which was castigated by labor for its apparent partiality to employers. Invalidating a
state statute that limited the authority of judges to issue injunctions in
labor disputes, the majority denounced labor picketing as “moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction” and concluded that “a law
which operates to make lawful such a wrong . . . deprives the owner of
the business and the premises of his property without due process.”53
Even as the Supreme Court invalidated anti-yellow dog laws for
abridging liberty of contract, it denied constitutional protection to labor

45

See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); CHRIS TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985).
46
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908).
47
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 6.
50
Id. at 23.
51
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 251 (1917).
52
257 U.S. 312 (1921).
53
Id. at 328.
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tactics, including the boycott and the strike. In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove
& Range Co.,54 the Court rejected out of hand the notion that the American Federation of Labor’s (AFL’s) “We Don’t Patronize List,” which cataloged employers that the AFL considered “unfair,” was protected First
Amendment expression.55 As a spokesperson for the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) explained, it was every bit as legitimate
“to enjoin the use of [a man’s] hands or his feet or his head to do some
unlawful thing” as it was “to use the injunction in connection with the
use of the tongue.”56
The same reasoning undergirded the Taft Court’s decisions during
the 1920s. In 1926, three years after invalidating a state compulsory
arbitration statute for unduly burdening businesses,57 the Court upheld
the criminal conviction of a union officer under the same law for engaging in a strike.58 The majority opinion decisively rejected labor’s attempt
to ground the right to strike in either the common law or the Constitution.59 Indeed, according to the courts, laws prohibiting strikes and boycotts served rather than impeded personal liberty. “The labor unions
and [their] officers,” reflected a lower court in Buck’s Stove, “meddle
into a member’s daily affairs deeper than does the law; restrict him in
matters that the law leaves free.”60
In the face of such decisions, labor leaders and their allies charged
the courts with hypocrisy.61 Increasingly, they accused the judiciary of
erecting a labor law regime best characterized as “Heads, I win; Tails,
you lose.”62 During the 1910s, progressives launched a frontal assault
on the courts, along with common law legalism and constitutionalism.63
Mainstream lawyers and politicians introduced various proposals to
54

221 U.S. 418 (1911).
Id. at 439.
56
See U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO
CONGRESS BY THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 64-415, at 10,823 (Statement of James A. Emery, May 18, 1915).
57
See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rel., 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923).
58
See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
59
Id.
60
Transcript of Record at 627, Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)
(No. 372).
61
See WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43, at ch. 1.
62
U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 10,895 (1st Sess.
1916) (Additional Statement of Theodore Schroeder, May 27, 1915).
63
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM (1949); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW
AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 187–97 (1998); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS:
SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
55
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curb judicial overreaching, and many states enacted provisions for the
democratic recall of judges. Concerns about the courts were sufficiently
pervasive that former president Theodore Roosevelt, campaigning for a
return to the White House on the Progressive Party ticket, promoted
the “recall of judicial decisions” and pronounced it “absolutely necessary
for the people themselves to take control of the interpretation of the
constitution.”64 Even some conservatives fretted that the judiciary’s
fiercely antilabor jurisprudence was straining popular confidence in the
courts and “endanger[ing] imbedded political and constitutional traditions of due process,” along with the American commitment to rule of
law.65
The campaign to curtail judicial power flagged during the 1920s,
when a combination of economic prosperity and state-sanctioned antilabor offensives dampened union influence. In 1924, the plank of the
Progressive Party platform urging abolition of “the tyranny and usurpation of the courts, including the practice of nullifying legislation in
conflict with the political, social or economic theories of the judges,”
found few supporters outside labor circles.66 But within a decade, judicial inflexibility in the face of the Great Depression made demands for
reform more urgent than ever. Notably, a reinvigorated labor movement was instrumental in reviving the attack on Lochner-era constitutionalism.67 After all, in the face of rising labor militancy, a decisive
congressional majority passed the NLRA in 1935.68 As violent strikes
roiled the nation, the statute aimed to improve economic conditions and
reduce labor unrest by legitimating union activity.69 Yet business
groups actively advised their members to disregard their obligations to
bargain with unions under the NLRA, on the theory that the Supreme

64

Progressive Party Platform, 1924, in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864–1981, vol. 3, 326 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice K.
Hofstadter eds., rev. ed. 1982); Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert David Croly, in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (Feb. 29, 1912), http://www.the
odorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record/?libID=o224709 [https://perma.cc/SC4S
-QJRB].
65
Charles O. Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 ABA J. 709, 710 (1940).
66
See, e.g., La Follette Has No Answer to Charges Made by Dawes, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA,
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 12, 1924; A Platform of Business Principles, NATION’S BUSINESS, Dec. 1924,
at 37.
67
JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 149–253 (1974); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS
201–71 (1982).
68
NLRA, 29 USC §§ 151–69. On the passage of the NLRA, see CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE
EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 56–80 (2005);
GROSS, supra note 67; IRONS, supra note 67.
69
IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941
(1969).
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Court was certain to consider it an unconstitutional incursion on the
property rights of employers and an unconstitutional interference with
the liberty of antiunion employees.70
By the mid-1930s, of course, the very future of judicial review was
in jeopardy. President Franklin Roosevelt’s much maligned Court-packing plan met political resistance for its disingenuous reliance on
strained judicial resources and its perceived aggrandizement of executive, in place of judicial, power.71 Other proposals, however, had ample
support. And many of them, including calls to abolish judicial review by
constitutional amendment, promised far greater inroads on judicial authority. In congressional hearings on the Court-packing plan and in impassioned public debate over the future of the courts, the judiciary’s
mistreatment of organized labor played an outsize role. To unions, victory in their decades-long battle against Lochner-era constitutionalism
at last appeared within reach.
III. FROM THE RIGHT TO STRIKE TO THE RIGHT TO WORK
As events unfolded, court-curbing measures proved unnecessary,
because in the spring of 1937 the Supreme Court unexpectedly changed
course. Ever since the Supreme Court handed them down, its decisions
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish72 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.73 have been described as the opening shots of a revolution in constitutional law.74 As future Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson
observed, the “avalanche of victories” issued that spring—which constituted “a legal revolution, as real and meaningful as any ever fought on
a field of battle”—“were the greatest days in labor’s legal history.”75 In

70

The American Bar Association concluded that such advice by the American Liberty League
was ethical. See Professional Ethics Committee Rules Organization and Offer of National Lawyers
Committee Not Unethical, 21 ABA J. 776, 777–78 (1934).
71
See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION
AND WAR 15–30 (1995); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE
TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (2009).
72
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
73
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
74
On the constitutional revolution, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); RICHARD A.
MAIDMENT, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW DEAL: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
ECONOMIC REGULATION, 1934–1936 (1991); AHR Forum: The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005). For an internalist explanation of the Court’s
about-face, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
75
Robert H. Jackson, Labor’s New Rights and Responsibilities, Aug. 24, 1937, Records of the
Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1933–1940, Subject Files, 1933–1940, Gen-
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accepting the constitutionality of minimum wage laws and subsequently of federal labor law, the Supreme Court definitively abandoned
its reliance on constitutional liberty and property rights (along with the
Commerce Clause) and signaled a new deference to government regulation of the economy.
The esteemed constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin was among
the first commentators to characterize the 1937 decisions as revolutionary, a label he grounded in the Supreme Court’s abandonment of its
laissez-faire conception of “liberty.”76 That is, what made the decisions
“so radical” and “so altogether dramatic” was their reconceptualization
of liberty “as something that may be infringed by other forces as well as
by those of government; indeed, something that may require the positive intervention of government against those other forces.”77 To be
sure, the Court did not identify this new form of liberty as an independent constitutional right. Even after 1937, neither theorists nor advocates ordinarily argued that state assistance for organized labor was
constitutionally compelled. Still, Corwin’s insight would prove crucial
in interpreting the NLRA and in deflecting subsequent constitutional
attacks on the statutory framework.
Looking forward, however, the late 1930s constitutional moment
was even more revolutionary than Corwin anticipated. The New Deal
Supreme Court did not stop at stripping employers of their Lochner-era
liberty and property rights. Even as it wrote employers’ antiunion appeals to freedom of contract out of the Constitution, it wrote First
Amendment protection for labor’s most powerful tactics in.
In its famous fourth footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,78 the Supreme Court flagged an exception to its new, hands-off approach to constitutional interpretation: it would continue to subject
laws to exacting judicial scrutiny where they burdened the rights of minorities or infringed freedom of speech.79 Although it is typically regarded as a subsequent development, the move to reclassify traditionally economic transactions as expressive ones was part and parcel of the
new constitutional regime. In fact, the lawyers and litigants who championed free speech in the years before Carolene Products were concerned above all with protecting labor’s rights.80 The American Civil
eral Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives and Record Administration, box 6, folder Jackson.
76
Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light, NEW REPUBLIC 354 (Aug. 4, 1937).
77
Id.
78
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
79
Id. at 152 n.4 (1938). On Carolene Products, see Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four:
A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004).
80
See generally WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43; Weinrib, Civil Liberties, supra note 43.
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Liberties Union (ACLU), which unabashedly described itself as a partisan of labor in its founding documents,81 promoted what it called a
“right of agitation”: a right of workers to picket, boycott, and strike.82
Despite deep ambivalence and even antipathy to constitutional rights
based claims among the organization’s early leadership,83 much of the
ACLU’s interwar litigation strategy was meant to make its prolabor
agenda palatable to the courts. Over the objections of labor movement
allies who regarded the judiciary as an inevitable abettor of industrial
interests, the ACLU stubbornly invited the courts to expand First
Amendment protection of labor picketing. Although it often emphasized
more anodyne pursuits—including its campaigns for academic and artistic freedom—its overarching objective was to render workers’ concerted activity a constitutional right.84 And particularly after the Supreme Court’s spring 1937 decisions blunted substantive due process as
an antilabor tool, the First Amendment strategy found friendly reception among labor leaders and their New Deal supporters.
It is a largely forgotten feature of constitutional history that this
labor vision of the First Amendment briefly prevailed. Today, the notion
of a right to strike, picket, and boycott independent of any regulatory
regime seems fanciful. But amid the industrial unrest of the 1930s, a
wide range of civil liberties advocates within and outside government
believed that protecting workers’ collective rights would stave off the
more extreme violence associated with labor struggles abroad.85 Moreover, few issues seemed more central than labor to the democratic concerns of the First Amendment.86 In Jones & Laughlin Steel, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes called the right of workers to organize a

81

See, e.g., Walter Nelles, Suggestions for Reorganization of the National Civil Liberties Bureau (undated), in American Civil Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–1950,
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ,
reel 16, vol. 120 (“We are frankly partisans of labor in the present struggle.”).
82
See ACLU, THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH 4–5, 15–18 (1921).
83
See Laura Weinrib, From Left to Rights: Civil Liberties Lawyering Between the World Wars,
LAW, CULTURE & HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2017), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/
1743872116641871 [https://perma.cc/Q2WU-4XPF].
84
See generally ACLU, supra note 82 (discussing the ACLU’s free speech objectives and focusing on labor rights such as assembly and demonstration, striking, and picketing).
85
The same impulse was behind the decision in the NLRA to mandate employer bargaining
with unions, since the most disruptive strikes often involved demands for employer recognition.
NLRA section one justifies the statutory regime in part on the basis that “[t]he denial by some
employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016).
86
By contrast, see Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2014) (“In the public sector, core
issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is generally
not so in the private sector.”).

20 WEINRIB PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

513]

THE RIGHT TO WORK AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

12/2/17 9:12 PM

527

“fundamental right.”87 The following month, Justice Louis Brandeis issued an opinion in Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union.88 In upholding
a Wisconsin statute that authorized labor picketing, Brandeis explained that union members were entitled to publicize the facts of a labor dispute because “freedom of speech is guaranteed by the federal
Constitution.”89 And the first case to invoke the speech-protective theory of footnote four of Carolene Products was a 1940 labor case, Thornhill v. Alabama,90 in which Justice Frank Murphy upheld the right to
picket as an expression of ideas.91 “Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” Murphy
reasoned.92 Thornhill’s companion case, Carlson v. California,93 added
that the “liberty of communication” protected by the First Amendment
also included the peaceful dissemination of “the facts of a labor dispute
. . . by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner.”94 Although these cases
are relegated to footnotes in most contemporary constitutional law casebooks, they were considered monumental in their time. Lee Pressman,
the erstwhile anti-judiciary general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) who argued Carlson in the Supreme Court,
expressed increasing confidence in the argument that “labor action is
nothing more or less than the exercise of constitutional rights.”95 It is
no wonder that in 1941, Herbert Wechsler adjudged the Supreme
Court’s decision incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to be far less important than the labor picketing cases, to
which he attributed “major significance.”96
In many respects, the First Amendment strategy for advancing labor’s rights was a risky one. As labor and industry both understood,
there were deep affinities between the effort to secure constitutional
protection for workers’ concerted activity and business leaders’ appeal
87

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
301 U.S. 468 (1937).
89
Id. at 478.
90
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
91
Id. at 102–05.
92
Id. at 103.
93
310 U.S. 106 (1940).
94
Id. at 113; see also Bakery & Pastry Drivers Loc. 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774 (1942)
(recognizing the constitutional right “to express a grievance in a labor matter by publication unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive”).
95
GILBERT J. GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE CIO 108
(1999).
96
Harry Shulman & Herbert Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, AALS Annual Meeting,
Chicago, Dec. 27, 1940, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 881, 885 (1938–1942).
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to liberty of contract.97 In fact, the ACLU secured conservative support
for free speech on precisely that basis, and the unlikely coalition that
resulted was instrumental in persuading the courts to expand the scope
of protected First Amendment activity. For example, in the run-up to
the Court-packing plan, the American Bar Association concluded that
the best way to preserve judicial review from democratic curtailment
was to persuade the public of the importance of the handful of civil liberties victories that the ACLU had litigated and the ABA had long opposed.98 The ABA’s civil liberties campaign did not forestall the Supreme Court’s spring 1937 decisions, which the organization’s next
president decried as “the most devastating destruction of constitutional
limitations upon Federal power.”99 Still, the civil liberties campaign
helped to improve the bar’s negative reputation. And the positive publicity—coupled with the swift realization that after the demise of Lochner-era liberty, civil liberties protections might provide an alternative
basis for constitutional argumentation when “the rights denied or the
privacy invaded were those of the business corporation”—led the ABA
to create a new Committee on the Bill of Rights in 1938.100 Among that
committee’s first tasks was to submit an amicus brief in a foundational
First Amendment labor case, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.101 The brief proved to be a public relations triumph, and the
ABA believed that it exerted considerable influence on the Court.102
The new fondness for free speech quickly extended from conservative lawyers to their corporate clients. Although media advocates had
long defended their business practices as extensions of the freedom of
the press, other pre-New Deal industrialists were content to rest on
their property rights, and they typically impugned free speech claims
for their subversive potential. But the Great Depression eroded the old
allure of private property as the anchor of American freedom, and so,

97

See WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 43, at ch. 6.
Id.
99
Frank J. Hogan, Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines, 25 ABA J. 629, 630 (1939).
100
Frank J. Hogan, Justice, Sure and Speedy, for All, Address to the Annual Meeting of the
ABA, 29 July 1938, Papers of Grenville Clark in the Dartmouth College Library, ML-7, Rauner
Special Collections Library, Hanover, NH, box 83, folder 45 [hereinafter Grenville Clark Papers].
101
307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance requiring a permit for public assembly because the ordinance gave officials broad power for “arbitrary suppression of free
expression”); see also Brief of the Comm. on the Bill of Rights, of the ABA, as Friends of the Court,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651) 1939 WL 48753.
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Grenville Clark to Charles Edmundson, 8 February 1940, Grenville Clark Papers, supra
note 100, at box 78, folder 93; Frank Hogan to members of the Board of Governors, 14 February
1939, Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers, Wesleyan University Collection on Legal Change, Middletown, Conn., box 123.
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increasingly, businesses began to denounce government regulatory efforts as infringements of First Amendment freedoms instead. By the
end of the 1930s, the pamphlets and public addresses of the National
Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce of the United
States were rife with references to the First Amendment. After all, Justice Brandeis’s decision in Senn had compared labor picketing to advertising, implicitly “invest[ing] both types of publicity pressures with the
dignity of freedom of speech.”103
The shift was swift and sweeping. In 1938, the NAM defended its
anti-New Deal lobbying as an exercise of free expression.104 Just months
after Thornhill was decided, the Chamber of Commerce highlighted the
potential benefits of constitutional protection for commercial speech.105
Above all, conservatives hoped that the First Amendment might chip
away at Congress’s newly validated protections for organized labor. At
the end of the decade, corporate lawyers and business groups denounced the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for preventing the
Ford Motor Company from distributing antiunion literature to its employees.106 What the agency characterized as an exercise of coercive interference with the right to organize, Ford’s lawyers and supporters
deemed an unlawful incursion on free expression. And the ACLU, concerned that any abrogation of free expression on the basis of economic
coercion would undermine First Amendment protection for the right to
strike, joined business groups in chastising the NLRB for its abridgment of free speech.
It was a short road from a First Amendment defense of the right to
oppose union activity to a First Amendment defense of the right to
work.107 Although employers had long argued that union security agreements (as well as strikes and boycotts) abridged the liberty interests of
non-members—and federal courts proved willing to rely on the common
law and antitrust protections to enjoin efforts to secure such concessions—the voluntary nature of bargaining agreements between unions
and employers in the pre-New Deal era weakened their link to federal
constitutional law. According to antilabor advocates, the NLRA supplied the requisite state action; and, in lieu of liberty of contract, the

103

Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937); Gregory, supra note 65, at

712.
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De Propaganda Fide, N.Y. HERALD-TRIBUNE, Mar. 6, 1938.
Garvin Croonquist, Letter to the Editor, Are Peddlers a Nuisance?, NATION’S BUSINESS,
Sept. 1940, at 51 (noting that free speech protection for door-to-door salespeople not only increases
competition but also supports local economies).
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First Amendment emerged as the most plausible hook for a constitutional claim. By June 1941, Samuel Pettengill counseled his audience
at the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to uphold the
“rights of the individual and of the minority” even as he decried the
closed shop and declared the right of strikebreakers to cross the picket
line,108 because the “equal right to work” was “the first right of all.”109 A
few years later, opponents of unions learned to cast the closed shop as
an independent incursion on free speech. “[N]o member dares to speak
out or to combine with his fellow-members against the entrenched
power of the union boss or so-called union majority,” insisted Cecil B.
DeMille, an early architect of the right-to-work movement.110
Such arguments were not lost on the critics of Lochner-era constitutionalism who had so recently enlisted the Supreme Court to their
point of view. Charles O. Gregory, a University of Chicago law professor
and prominent labor scholar, captured widespread concerns when he
criticized the Thornhill decision in the ABA Journal.111 According to
Gregory, common law restraints on nonviolent union activity had no
place in the post New Deal legal order. By the same token, state legislatures might sensibly protect union activity from employer interference; the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in Truax v. Corrigan
“still baffle[d] good lawyers.”112 On the other hand, it was no more legitimate to shield labor picketing from state regulation on First Amendment grounds than it was to insulate employers against state regulation on the basis of liberty of contract. “True liberals in this country no
longer look askance at economic compulsion,” Gregory argued, but to
“call such coercion constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech” was
a “perversion of an American ideal.”113 He reflected:
For years the “Old Court” was under fire because of its doctrine
of “substantive due process” developed to make possible the invalidation of local legislative experiments. It now seems from the
picketing cases of last Spring that the “New Court” is perpetu-
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Samuel Pettengill, What’s Ahead for America?, NATION’S BUSINESS, June 1941, at 36.
Id. at 47.
110
Quoted in LEE, supra note 1, at 73.
111
Gregory, supra note 65.
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Id. at 711. On statutory protections of public sector employees’ right to organize, see JOSEPH
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ating this error by using the Fourteenth Amendment to establish its conception of the guaranties of liberty set forth in the
First Amendment.114
To Gregory, Thornhill and Carlson—like the Lochner-era cases before
them—were dangerous usurpations of government authority to regulate labor relations. Gregory, in short, was lamenting the Lochnerization of the First Amendment.
IV. LABOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE
It is a deep irony of the interwar civil liberties movement that its
overarching purpose was to inscribe into law a First Amendment right
to picket, boycott, and strike, and yet those rights were written out of
the First Amendment almost as soon as Carolene Products was decided.
Presumably the justices of the Supreme Court were weighing assessments like Charles Gregory’s when they sharply limited constitutional
protection for labor activity just one year after introducing it. In 1941,
the Court issued a decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,115 upholding a state court’s injunction against
picketing by a union that had previously engaged in property destruction and violence. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter
concluded that “utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force,”
and that subsequent picketing, even if peaceful, could constitutionally
be enjoined.116 Frankfurter had earlier championed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,117 the landmark federal legislation that limited the federal
courts’ injunctive power in labor disputes, and subsequent commentators have strained to explain his apparent about face.118 To many of his
contemporaries, however, Frankfurter’s reasoning was apparent. Not
only would expanding constitutional protection for union speech trench
on legislative prerogatives; it would also open the door to First Amendment claims by employers.119 As Charles Gregory mused, it was “disquieting to hear proponents of organized labor applaud [Thornhill and
114

Id. at 714–15.
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
116
Id. at 293.
117
29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15 (2016).
118
See especially FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)
(articulating Frankfurter and Greene’s critique of labor injunctions).
119
See, e.g., H. D., Memorandum for Messrs. Wood and McCormack, 13 February 1941, Ford
Motor Company Legal Papers, Benson Ford Research Center, Dearborn, MI, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 5
(speculating “that Justice Frankfurter was encouraged to go so far in limiting peaceful picketing
because the ruling would establish a precedent which would sustain the Labor Board’s position on
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Carlson] and then condemn a manufacturer who, contrary to the terms
of the Wagner Act, insists upon telling his employees exactly what he
thinks of a certain labor union and why.”120 Some groups, including the
ACLU, thought the solution was to safeguard the First Amendment
rights of unions and employers alike. Many New Dealers, including
many judges, preferred to withhold constitutional protection from both.
As the 1940s unfolded, it was the latter approach that prevailed.
When strikes or pickets were most effective, and therefore most coercive, they lost their status as constitutionally protected expression.121
No doubt judges and justices were motivated by a range of competing
concerns. Some were driven by an abiding commitment to judicial restraint, lest Lochnerism rear its head. Reflecting backwards, they worried that the invigoration of the First Amendment would lead to judicial
usurpation of the police power in the service of industry. Others interpreted the massive strike wave at the end of the Second World War as
evidence that the labor law pendulum had swung too far toward organized labor. Before the New Deal, courts had suppressed strikes and
boycotts while extending constitutional protection to yellow-dog contracts and extolling the virtues of the open shop. A decade later, strikes
were constitutionally protected and yellow-dog contracts were not. As
union membership skyrocketed and workers voiced the demands they
had tabled during the war, many Americans blamed the New Deal labor
law regime for excessively inflating union power; some judges presumably agreed. Still others remained personally partial to organized labor
but believed that the legitimacy and survival of constitutional liberalism required the Court to avoid the appearance of bias in its application
of countermajoritarian principles. Conservative efforts to embed the
right to work in the First Amendment did not directly succeed in the
1940s, at least in the courts, but they may have achieved a more attenuated victory in checking the labor vision of civil liberties. No doubt the
specter of a First Amendment right to work affected the litigants and
advocates who engaged with the First Amendment right to strike.

free speech”).
120
Gregory, supra note 65, at 715.
121
See, e.g., Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). The Supreme Court did, however,
continue to recognize limited speech rights in the context of labor organizing. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). For explanation and discussion of this trajectory, see James Gray
Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518
(2004); James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941 (1999); Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 295–300
(2015).
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The First Amendment labor cases of the 1940s and 1950s crystalized into a compact that lasted, with some modifications at the margins,
for more than fifty years. Over the course of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court unceremoniously denied constitutional protection to the
very modes of expression that it pronounced core to First Amendment
ideals in other domains. A long list of labor law’s First Amendment
anomalies is easy to assemble. The same collective bargaining agreements that require non-members to contribute agency fees also require
both members and non-members to forgo much more recognizable First
Amendment expression while the contract is in effect. Yet the Court has
long since deemed no-strike clauses enforceable by injunction, notwithstanding the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.122 Meanwhile, the
NLRA directly limits recognitional picketing and secondary activity,
along with wildcat strikes.123 And of course, many states simply prohibit
strikes by public sector workers, in terms that far outstrip the usual
latitude afforded states in regulating government employees. In the ordinary political context, of course, picketing is quintessential First
Amendment activity, and declining to protect it would be virtually unfathomable.124 Labor picketing, labor boycotts, and union associational
activity are all routinely curbed by the state.125
V.

CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS FROM LOCHNER

As the Roberts Court has forged ahead with the Lochnerization of
the First Amendment, it has begun to expand constitutional protections
for employees who object to the payment of union dues. It has curtailed
the ability of public sector unions to collect payments toward ideological
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Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Loc. 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (“The substantive evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise.”).
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For a comprehensive analysis of the inconsistency between the labor and non-labor picketing cases, see Fisk & Rutter, supra note 121, at 300–15. Earlier scholarship examining the differential treatment of labor speech includes Cynthia Estlund, Labor Picketing and Commercial
Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L. J. 938 (1982); Mark D.
Schneider, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1982).
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See supra note 124. On boycotts, compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982) (extending First Amendment protection to civil rights boycotting), with International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (upholding Congress’ authority
to prohibit secondary boycotting under the NLRA). The Court has also arguably favored corporations over labor unions in the campaign finance context. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Citizens,
United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2011);
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Associational Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013).
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activity by adjusting the default rules of non-member contributions,126
and it has reduced the class of state-funded workers covered by
Abood.127 Thus far, it has declined to extend reciprocal protection to labor’s expressive activity. It has evinced no readiness to reevaluate precedent rejecting unions’ freedom of association claims,128 and it has accepted statutory restrictions on secondary activity and the right to
strike. This outcome would have been a tremendous surprise to interwar advocates and judges. At the end of the New Deal, all the signs
pointed the other way. Unions enjoyed burgeoning First Amendment
rights, whereas the objections of non-members were of minimal constitutional concern.129
If the Supreme Court recognizes a First Amendment right to work
in Janus v. AFSCME, a cascade of cases will follow. As an initial matter,
the dues-paying members in that new regime may plausibly object that
the government is forcing them to subsidize non-members in violation
of their First Amendment rights.130 But the slippery slope is steeper
than that. Union members may also feel that an injunction to enforce a
no-strike clause is incompatible with the First Amendment. They may
argue that they are entitled to express their solidarity with other struggling workers—that picketing over disputes at distant workplaces is
protected by the Constitution, even when unions are involved.131 For
their part, the right-to-work forces are almost certain to transpose their
argument onto private sector labor law, which the Supreme Court (sidestepping a significant state action question with respect to constitutional claims132) has proven inclined to align with its public sector decisions as a matter of statutory interpretation. And they have already
126

See Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Hwy. Emps., Loc. 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (“The public
employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the
First Amendment from retaliation for doing so. . . . But the First Amendment does not impose any
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the
association and bargain with it.”). Cf. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.
2013). Section 1 of the NLRA declares Congress’ commitment to “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association.”
129
As Charles Gregory explained, unions had “won the support of thousands of intellectual
leaders who are actuated by the social movement aspects of unionism and who seem to have ignored the dangers of the sort of power which federated universal closed shops may bring.” Gregory,
supra note 65, at 714.
130
See Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 32, at 470–72, 482–85.
131
See Fisk & Rutter, supra note 121, at 322–28, for an argument that the NLRB should expand its protection of secondary activity as a matter of statutory interpretation to avoid infringing
on the First Amendment. For a broad contemporary defense of the “constitutional right to organize,” see Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Constitutional Right to Organize (Working Paper, Sept. 26, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864100 [https://perma.cc/4PHU-FKNH].
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On the state action problem in private sector labor law, see generally LEE, supra note 1.
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asked the Supreme Court to reassess the First Amendment status of
public sector exclusive representation.133
One might imagine that the Court’s one-sided First Amendment
expansion will prove difficult to contain. In fact, lower courts have begun to narrow the class of secondary activity subject to regulation. And
to the extent the justices hold the line, they will open themselves to the
same charges of hypocrisy and antilabor bias that beset their Lochnerera forebears. Moving forward, lawyers, litigants, and judges will have
to decide whether robust First Amendment review of labor law would
ultimately serve their interests, and at what cost.134
During the decades after the Constitutional Revolution, the Supreme Court insisted that the First Amendment must occasionally yield
to legislative choices about “the competing interests of unions, employers, their employees, and the public at large.”135 In upholding a state
injunction against peaceful picketing in the 1957 decision Teamsters
Union v. Vogt,136 Justice Frankfurter explained on behalf of the Supreme Court majority that constitutional protection for free speech did
not immunize labor activity from state regulation.137 In a mournful dissent, Justice Douglas described the decision as a “formal surrender.”138
“[F]or practical purposes,” he explained, the law had reverted to the
“situation . . . as it was when Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union was
decided.”139 Organized labor was protected by statute rather than the
Constitution, as it was in the brief period been between the Supreme
Court’s validation of the NLRA in Jones & Laughlin Steel and its subsequent decisions elevating union activity to First Amendment status.
That is, labor picketing was subject to government regulation, as it was
before the modern First Amendment took shape.
But in accusing the Court of “com[ing] full circle,”140 Justice Douglas exaggerated the extent of the Court’s retreat. The picketing decisions of the mid-twentieth century reflected a durable compromise, pursuant to which both labor and antiunion activity were insulated from
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hill v. SEIU, 85 U.S.L.W. 46 (U.S. June 8, 2017), cert. denied,
86 U.S.L.W. 18 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2017).
134
For a compelling explanation of the contemporary labor movement’s reluctance to embrace
a constitutional strategy, see Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591
(2016).
135
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957).
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354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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Id. at 289.
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Id. at 297 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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Id. at 295.

20 WEINRIB PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

536

12/2/17 9:12 PM

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

First Amendment challenge. Lurking behind labor’s First Amendment
exceptionalism was the recognition that the postwar labor law regime,
with its complicated balancing of employer and worker rights, had operated to dampen industrial unrest and facilitate American economic
growth.141 To advance these goals—which may have seemed like “compelling government interests,” though the accommodation was rarely
framed in conventional doctrinal terms—the courts constrained the operation of the First Amendment in the labor context. Just as an unequivocal right to strike would unleash unpalatable economic power, an
unequivocal right to work would disturb the New Deal settlement and
impugn the legitimacy of the courts, not to mention the stability of the
postwar legal order.
Against this broader backdrop, recognizing a First Amendment obstacle to public sector agency fees threatens to unweave the web. To
couch the right to work in the Constitution while licensing courts and
legislatures to suppress the right to strike would truly be to “come full
circle.” It would replicate the constitutional dynamics of the Lochner
era, an approach excoriated by generations of scholars and judges for
its lopsided attentiveness to the interests of antiunion workers and employers.142 It would, in short, mark a return “for practical purposes” to
the “situation . . . as it was” before Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided.
And the situation then, it bears remembering, was a world on the brink
of revolution.
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The tradeoffs entailed by the NLRB’s state-centered approach are discussed in Karl E.
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiograhy of Collective Bargaining Law, 4
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 450 (1981); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978);
Christpher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining and the Triumph of Industrial Pluralism, 39 IND. LAB. REL. REV. 19 (1985).
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See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-7, 108–24 (2011) (characterizing Lochner as “the most
disreputable case in modern constitutional discourse”); see also Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125
HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).

